Weak Overseas Protection for American Software Patents: The Need for a Congressional Response to Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp. by Norman, Erika Danielle
Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
Volume 8 Issue 1 Article 5 
9-1-2008 
Weak Overseas Protection for American Software Patents: The 
Need for a Congressional Response to Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T 
Corp. 
Erika Danielle Norman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Erika D. Norman, Weak Overseas Protection for American Software Patents: The Need for a 
Congressional Response to Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 8 Chi. -Kent J. Intell. Prop. 111 (2008). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/vol8/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of 
Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact 
jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
Copyright © 2008, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
8 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 111 
 
WEAK OVERSEAS PROTECTION FOR AMERICAN SOFTWARE 
PATENTS: THE NEED FOR A CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO 
MICROSOFT CORP. v. AT & T CORP. 
Erika Danielle Norman* 
 
“To ensure that we maintain our technological leadership, we must provide strong 
incentives for American firms to create and commercialize technology. One of the most 
important vehicles for providing such incentives is the patent system ... These patent 
incentives are strong only when the patent laws and procedures operate effectively.”1 
  
-Donald W. Banner, President, Intellectual Property Owners, Inc., 
Washington, D.C., 1984. 
  
I. Introduction 
A recurring issue under American patent law2 is the extent to which a U.S. actor is 
liable as a patent infringer for supplying components of an invention, patented in the 
United States, for assembly abroad.3  Because governments create and protect patent 
rights, those rights cannot extend further than the geographical reach of the government’s 
power.4 However, determining *112 the reach of U.S. patent rights is complicated because 
commercial activities involving patented products frequently cross international 
boundaries.5 
 
                                                             
* J.D. Candidate, University of Oregon School of Law, 2009. Articles Editor, Oregon Law Review, 
2008-2009. I would like to thank Professor Jim Mooney for his wisdom and support. Thanks also to Professor 
SkinnerLopata for his insight and enthusiasm. Finally, I would like to thank my father, William Norman, for 
his love, encouragement, and counsel in this and in all of my endeavors. 
1 S. 1535, 98th Cong. § 1, at 43 (1983) (statement of Donald W. Banner, President, Intellectual Property 
Owners, Inc.). 
2 Current U.S. patent law is codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000). 
3 See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972) (holding the export of all the parts to an 
infringing shrimp-deveining machine for assembly and use abroad did not constitute infringement of 
defendant’s patent); see also Radio Corp. of Am. v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1935) (holding 
unassembled export of radio receivers and vacuum tubes for sale abroad did not infringe plaintiff’s patent on 
a radio receiver with a vacuum tube inserted into the radio receiver’s socket); Cold Metal Process Co. v. 
United Eng’g & Foundry Co., 235 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1956) (applying Andrea to the manufacture of patented 
steel rolling mills abroad from parts supplied from the United States); Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Link Belt Co., 
371 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1966) (applying Andrea to the manufacture of patented ore bedding and reclaiming 
devices abroad from parts supplied from the United States). 
4 3 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS, 11-16 (4th ed. 2006). 
5 Id. at 11-16-11-17. 
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35 U.S.C. § 271(f) provides that where an invention patented in the United States is 
constructed abroad without the consent of the U.S. patent holder, a party within the United 
States contributing to the infringement may be liable if the combination of the invention’s 
“components” abroad would infringe the patent had the combination occurred within the 
United States.6 Section 271(f)(1) addresses circumstances where the U.S. party supplies 
all or a substantial portion of the U.S. patented invention’s components that are combined 
abroad.7 Section 271(f)(2) addresses circumstances where the U.S. party supplies only one 
component of a U.S. patented invention that is combined abroad.8 
In 2001, AT & T sued Microsoft for infringement under § 271(f). AT & T alleged 
that Microsoft had infringed AT & T’s patent on a speech-processing computer by 
supplying its Windows operating system software to foreign computer manufacturers, who 
installed copies of it on computers made abroad.9  Microsoft admitted that installing 
Windows on a computer allowed the computer to operate as AT & T’s patented speech 
processor.10 Thus, Microsoft conceded liability for domestic infringement under §§ 271(a) 
and (b).11 However, Microsoft argued that it was not liable for foreign infringement under 
§ 271(f) because it did not supply any *113 U.S. components of the computers 
manufactured abroad;12 it supplied only CD-ROMs (“golden master” disks) and electronic 
                                                             
6 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000). 
7 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). For the full text of § 271(f)(1) see infra note 35. 
8 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2). For the full text of § 271(f)(2) see infra note 38. 
9 AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ. 4872, 2004 WL 406640 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004), aff’d, 414 
F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d 127 S.Ct. 1746 (2007). 
10 Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1750 (2007). 
11 See infra p. 11. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) reads: “Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without 
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into 
the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.” 35 
U.S.C. § 271(b) reads: “Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” 
12 AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ. 4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004). 
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transmissions containing Windows from which copies were made abroad.13 Microsoft 
contended that because foreign computer manufacturers copied Windows abroad from 
CD-ROMs or electronic transmissions, only copies of the infringing software were 
installed on foreign-made computers. 14  Consequently, Microsoft argued it had not 
supplied any U.S. components of the infringing computers made abroad.15 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that computer 
software code itself, like the Windows object code16 contained on the golden master disks 
supplied from the United States, qualified as a component under § 271(f).17 The Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. 18  Reversing, the Supreme Court accepted 
Microsoft’s argument and ruled that the Windows object code contained on the golden 
masters was not a component within the meaning of § 271(f).19 
Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., the 
current language of § 271(f) precludes treating software, such as the Windows object code 
at issue in Microsoft, as a “component.”20 As a result, current § 271(f), as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court, leaves U.S. software patent holders unprotected against the 
exploitation of their patented technologies abroad.21 
This Note contends that Congress’s purpose in enacting § 271(f) was broader than 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the current statutory language suggests. 
Consequently, to fully *114 protect the U.S. software industry, in a manner consistent with 
                                                             
13 Id. at *1. 
14 Id. at *2. 
15 Id. 
16 See text accompanying note 82 for an explanation of object code. 
17 AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ. 4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004). 
18 AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d 127 S.Ct. 1746 (2007). 
19 Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1755-56 (2007). 
20 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). 
21 See Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. 1746 (2007); see also § 271(f). 
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the policy behind Congress’s enactment of § 271(f), a legislative fix is needed. 
Specifically, Congress should amend § 271(f) so that software object code qualifies as a 
component under the statute. 
Part I sets forth the legal background of § 271(f), including its application prior to 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Microsoft. Part II examines the facts of Microsoft and 
analyzes the district court and Supreme Court rulings. Part III then addresses the 
implications of the Supreme Court’s decision for the U.S. software industry and proposes a 
legislative response to Microsoft to effectuate the broad policy behind Congress enacting § 
271(f) in 1984. 
II. The Legal Background 
A. The 1984 Enactment of § 271(f) 
Section 271(f) was enacted in 1984 as a legislative response to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972). 22  In 
Deepsouth, Laitram Corp. alleged that Deepsouth Packing Co.’s manufacture of 
shrimp-deveining machines in the United States under its patent infringed Laitram’s own 
U.S. patent on a shrimp-deveining machine.23 The district court held that Laitram had the 
superior patent claim and that Deepsouth’s manufacturing activity constituted 
infringement of Laitram’s patent and thereupon enjoined Deepsouth from using and 
                                                             
22 See S. REP. No. 98-663, at 2-3 (1984) (“[§ 271(f) is] a response to the Supreme Court’s 1972 Deepsouth 
decision which interpreted the patent law not to make it infringement where final assembly and sale is 
abroad”); see also FISCH & ALLEN, The Application of Domestic Patent Law to Exported Software: 35 
U.S.C. § 271(f), 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 557, 565 (2004) (“Congress specifically intended § 271(f) as 
a response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Deepsouth”). 
23 Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 301 F.Supp. 1037, 1040 (E.D. Va. 1969), rev’d 443 F.2d 928 
(5th Cir. 1971), rev’d 406 U.S. 518 (1972). 
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distributing its deveining machine.24 Deepsouth moved to modify the injunction to clarify 
that the injunction did not prohibit Deepsouth from exporting all of its machine 
components for assembly and use outside the United States.25 The District Court *115 for 
the Eastern District of Louisiana agreed to modify the injunction.26 The Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals later reversed27 and the U.S. Supreme Court granted Deepsouth’s certiorari 
petition.28 
Deepsouth argued before the Supreme Court that the Patent Act of 195229 barred it 
only from manufacturing and selling its infringing deveining machine in the United 
States.30 The Court held that Deepsouth was not liable for infringement of Laitram’s patent 
because it neither made, sold, or used the fully assembled patented deveining machine 
within the United States, nor actively induced infringement within the United States.31 
Nothing in the Patent Act of 1952 expressly prohibited Deepsouth from making all of its 
deveiner parts in the United States and then selling those parts as a kit to foreign buyers 
who assembled the parts and used or sold the machines abroad.32 The Court stated that in 
the absence of a “clear congressional indication of intent” the district court could not enjoin 
Deepsouth from manufacturing and selling the parts of Laitram’s patented machine for 
                                                             
24 Id. at 1066. 
25 Id. 
26 Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 928, 928-29 (5th Cir. 1971), rev’d 406 U.S. 518 
(1972). 
27 Id. 
28 Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 1037 (U.S. 
Jan. 17, 1972). 
29 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792. 
30 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 522-24 (1972). 
31 Id. at 532. 
32 See generally Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792. Deepsouth actually shipped all the 
parts of its deveining machine “to foreign customers in three separate boxes, each containing only parts of the 
1 ¾-ton machines, yet the whole [was] assemblable in less than one hour.” Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 532 (1972). 
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assembly and use abroad.33 
Congress responded to Deepsouth by amending § 271 to expand infringement to 
include supplying component(s) of an invention patented in the United States for assembly 
abroad. 34  *116 Section 271(f)(1) prohibits an actor within the United States from 
supplying or causing to be supplied in or from the United States, without authority from the 
patent holder, “all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention.”35 
Paragraph (f)(1) applies to components “uncombined in whole or in part.”36 The actor 
supplying components under (f)(1) must do so “in such manner as to actively induce the 
combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would 
infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States.”37 
Section 271(f)(2) prohibits an actor within the United States from supplying or 
causing to be supplied in or from the United States, without authority from the patent 
                                                             
33 Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 532. The Supreme Court in Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp. commented on this 
portion of the Deepsouth opinion: “Our patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect; these acts of 
Congress do not and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United States; and we 
correspondingly reject the claims of others to such control over our markets.” Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T 
Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1752 (2007) (quoting Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 531). The Court in Microsoft seemed 
troubled by what it saw to be “the expanded extraterritorial thrust AT & T’s reading of § 271(f) entails,” and 
ultimately left it to Congress as did the Court in Deepsouth to mark the Court’s course in that area. See 
Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1760. 
34 This legislative development in patent law has been criticized for extending the scope of protection of U.S. 
patents extraterritorially. MOY, supra note 4, at 12-28. Such concerns over the extraterritorial reach of § 
271(f) seemed to influence the majority opinion in Microsoft. See Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1746. The Court in 
Microsoft relies on F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. for its holding that § 271(f) cannot be 
interpreted so as to give the statute extraterritorial effect because the Court should “assume that legislators 
take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they write American laws.” Id. at 
1758 (quoting F. Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004)). Other commentators have taken the 
position that while the overall effect of § 271(f) is to allow patent owners to exert some control over 
commercial activities occurring abroad, these patent owners do so by focusing on the accused infringer’s 
activities within the United States. See, e.g., MOY, supra note 4, at 12-28. 
35 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). Section 271(f)(1) reads: 
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial 
portion of the components of a patented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in 
part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in 
a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable 
as an infringer. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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holder, “any component of a patented invention.” 38  Paragraph (f)(2) also applies to 
components “uncombined in whole or in part.”39 The actor supplying a component under 
(f)(2) must have knowledge that the component is “especially made or especially adapted 
for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for 
substantial non-infringing use” and must intend *117 that the component “be combined 
outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination 
occurred within the United States.”40 
Sections 271(f)(1) and (f)(2) are identical in several respects. Both require the 
infringer to act “without authority” from the patent holder.41 And, the prohibited act of 
supplying or causing to be supplied is the same under both paragraphs.42 Both (f)(1) and 
(f)(2) require the supplying act to be “in or from the United States”43 and the component(s) 
supplied to be “uncombined in whole or in part.”44 Finally, (f)(1) and (f)(2) require that the 
combining of the component(s) abroad be done “in a manner that would infringe the patent 
if such combination occurred within the United States.”45 
However, important differences between (f)(1) and (f)(2) exist. Under (f)(1), the 
supplier must supply “all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented 
                                                             
38 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2). Section 271(f)(2) reads: 
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States any component of a 
patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple 
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is 
uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such 
component will be combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such 
combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. Courts have interpreted this phrase to require that the components at issue actually be manufactured in 
the United States. See, e.g., Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
44 § 271(f). 
45 Id. 
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invention,”46 whereas under (f)(2), the supplier need only supply “any component.”47 In 
addition, (f)(2) requires that the supplied component be “especially made or especially 
adapted for use in the invention and not be a staple article or commodity of commerce 
suitable for substantial non-infringing use,” that the actor have knowledge that the 
component is so made or adapted, and that the actor intend the component be combined 
abroad “in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the 
United States.”48 
*118 B. Status of § 271(f) as Applied to the Software Industry Before Microsoft 
Most court decisions addressing § 271(f) before Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp. 
involved components of mechanical inventions49 or chemical compounds.50 Courts were 
generally unwilling to apply § 271(f) to design or method patents51 seemingly because 
                                                             
46 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). 
47 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2). In Feildturf, Inc. v. Sw. Recreational Indus., Inc., the court held that the supply of 
only one component of the plaintiff’s patented artificial turf system from the United States would not trigger 
an application of § 271(f)(1). 235 F.Supp.2d 708, 733 (E.D. Ky. 2002). 
48 § 271(f)(2). 
49 See FISCH & ALLEN, supra note 22, at 567-68 (citing T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Laymon, 723 F.Supp. 
587, 590 (N.D. Okla. 1989) (applying § 271(f) to a “caliper pig” used for gathering information on the 
internal geometry of pipelines); Smith Int’l Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., CV No. 72-1231, 1986 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 28247 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 1986) (applying § 271(f) to intricate drill bits)). 
50 See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co.--Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F.Supp.2d 316, 319 (D. Del. 1999) (applying 35 
U.S.C. § 271(f) to patented chemical compounds used to reduce emissions in oil refining and similar 
processes); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16895, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2001) (applying § 271(f) to a chemical compound produced in New 
York and then combined with another chemical compound in Ireland to produce the alleged infringing cancer 
chemotherapeutic drug). Perhaps as a result of the lack of case law addressing § 271(f), as recently as in 2000, 
one commentator suggested that the statute serves little purpose at all. FISCH & ALLEN, supra note 22, at 
567 (citing Timothy F. Myers, Foreign Infringement of Business Methods Patents, 7 WILLAMETTE J. 
INT’L L & DISPUTE RES. 101, 109 (2000)). 
51 A design patent may be obtained on surface ornamentations, configurations, or both. 1 DONALD S. 
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 104 (2003). A method patent may be obtained on novel techniques 
that perform a commercial function and which technique is not embodied in a specific invention. FISCH & 
ALLEN, supra note 22, at 570-71. 
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those patents appear to lack the requisite components.52 
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Imagexpo L.L.C. v. 
Microsoft Corp.53 was the first to apply § 271(f) in the context of computer software 
code.54 Imagexpo L.L.C. alleged that Microsoft’s NetMeeting software that Microsoft 
exported overseas via master disks infringed Imagexpo’s software patent.55 Microsoft 
filed a motion in limine to prevent Imagexpo from presenting evidence of foreign-made 
computers containing copies of the allegedly infringing NetMeeting software code made 
from master disks that Microsoft had shipped abroad. 56  Microsoft asserted that the 
NetMeeting software code it supplied from the *119 United States was not a component 
under § 271(f).57 Judge Hudson of the Eastern District of Virginia concluded that the 
master disks Microsoft supplied to its overseas representatives, as well as the NetMeeting 
software code that they contained, were components within the meaning of § 271(f), and 
therefore denied Microsoft’s motion.58 
Microsoft also lost on similar facts in Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
where Eolas Technologies, Inc. alleged that aspects of Microsoft’s software program, 
Internet Explorer, incorporated Eolas’s patented software invention.59 Microsoft filed a 
pretrial motion to bar Eolas from seeking damages for the production and sale abroad of 
                                                             
52 See e.g., Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F.Supp.2d 537, 539 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that a method 
patent “has no ‘components’ for the purposes of § 271(f)”); Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., 
Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding § 271(f) cannot be implicated in the case of a method 
patent for the production of asphalt). 
53 Imagexpo L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 299 F.Supp.2d 550 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
54 FISCH & ALLEN, supra note 22, at 584. 
55 Imagexpo, 299 F.Supp.2d at 551-52. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 552-53. 
58 Id. As a result, the jury was permitted to award damages to Imagexpo based on the fact that copies of the 
NetMeeting software originally supplied by Microsoft from the United States were installed on foreign-made 
computers. Id. at 553. 
59 Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Essentially, Eolas’s claimed 
software invention “allows a user to use a web browser in a fully interactive environment ... to view news 
clips or play games across the internet.” Id. at 1328. 
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computers with hard drives containing copies of Internet Explorer made from a master disk 
shipped from the United States.60 As in Imagexpo, Microsoft argued in Eolas that its 
Internet Explorer software code contained on the master disks did not constitute a 
component under § 271(f).61 Judge Zegel of the Eastern District of Illinois held that the 
software code was an “operating element” of the infringing device and thus a “component” 
for purposes of § 271(f)—not, as Microsoft argued, a mere “recipe” or “template.”62 The 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the term “component” 
under § 271(f) included software code contained in master disks.63 
*120 Although both Imagexpo and Eolas addressed how § 271(f) applied to 
computer software, the cases did not address adequately, as stated by the Supreme Court in 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., whether software in the abstract (object code), a tangible 
copy of software, or both, were components under § 271(f).64 AT & T argued that the 
                                                             
60 Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 99C626, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13482, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 
2003). 
61 Id. at *5. 
62 Id. at *4-5. Judge Zegel compared the facts of Eolas to a case in which “defendants sent chemical products 
abroad that were combined with other compounds into compositions that would have infringed a U.S. patent 
had the combination occurred [in the United States].” Id. at *4-5. Microsoft later unsuccessfully moved 
reconsideration, claiming the Federal Circuit’s decision in Bayer AG v. Housy Pharms. had overruled Judge 
Zegel’s ruling. Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 99C0626, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 534, at *14 (N.D. 
Ill. Jan. 14, 2004). See Bayer, 340 F.3d 1367, 1373-78 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (dismissing patent infringement 
counterclaim under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) against drug company that used information it received from the 
defendant’s patented process to make its own drugs and finding § 271(g) to cover only infringement through 
the manufacture of physical goods and not the supply of information generated by a patented process). Judge 
Zegel rejected Microsoft’s arguments for reconsideration in Eolas: 
At the heart of Microsoft’s argument is its assertion that the source code contained on the ‘golden master’ is 
merely intangible information ... I disagree. The source code contained on the ‘golden master’ is not 
intangible information, but instead a real and substantial part of the final product. Because I find that the 
source code present on the ‘golden master’ is not intangible information, Bayer does not affect my decision. 
Eolas, 2004 LEXIS 534, at *14. The question of whether source code can qualify as a component under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(f) was not addressed by the Court in Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp. See infra p. 20. Object 
code, at least in the context presented by the facts of the case, cannot qualify as a component under § 271(f). 
See Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1755-56 (2007). 
63 Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
64 Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. 1746. “The Federal Circuit panel in this case, relying on that court’s prior decision in 
[Eolas], held that software qualifies as a component under § 271(f). We are unable to determine, however, 
whether the Federal Circuit panels regarded as a component software in the abstract, or a copy of software.” 
Id. at 1754 n.10. 
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Windows object code contained on the master disks that Microsoft supplied from the 
United States abroad was a component because the object code became part of the 
computers sold to end users abroad.65 Under facts similar to those in Imagexpo and Eolas, 
the Microsoft Court held that the object code was more like a set of instructions, like those 
at issue in Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc.,66 than a component.67 In Pellegrini, the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that supplying instructions from the United 
States for the manufacture abroad of infringing computer chips did not implicate § 
271(f). 68  According to Pellegrini, instructions to construct and combine certain 
components to form a patented invention are not themselves components of the 
invention.69 
*121 III. The Microsoft Case 
A. The Facts of Microsoft 
AT & T held a patent on an apparatus that generated and received coded speech 
signals from audible voice sounds and converted them back into audible voice sounds.70 
AT & T’s patent is infringed when a computer is loaded with a speech codec71 that allows 
the computer to function as AT & T’s patented speech processor.72 Microsoft conceded 
that a computer loaded with Windows is capable of coding and decoding speech in a 
                                                             
65 Id. at 1755. 
66 Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
67 Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1755. 
68 Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1117-19. 
69 Id. 
70 Brief for the Respondent, Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746 (2007), at 7-8 (No. 05-1056). 
See U.S. Patent No. RE32,580 (filed Sep. 18, 1986) (reissued Jan. 19, 1988). 
71 “A speech codec is a software program that is capable of coding -- converting a speech signal into a more 
compact code -- and decoding -- converting the more compact code back into a signal that sounds like the 
original speech signal.” AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ. 4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004). 
72 Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1750. 
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manner that “practices” AT & T’s patent.73 
AT & T repeatedly requested that Microsoft obtain a license to use AT & T’s 
patented speech-processing technology, but Microsoft continually refused.74 Eventually, 
AT & T sued Microsoft for patent infringement.75  Microsoft stipulated that it made 
infringing devices in the United States, violating § 271(a)76 when it installed Windows on 
its own computers to develop, test, and debug the software.77 Microsoft also stipulated to 
liability under § 271(b)78 by sending Windows to U.S.-based computer manufacturers 
with the intent that they install the software on computers made within the United States.79 
The principal issue in the litigation became whether Microsoft was liable under § 271(f) for 
supplying U.S.-made components of AT & T’s invention for combination abroad.80 
*122 The relevant facts of Microsoft were summarized as follows: Microsoft 
“conceives, writes, compiles, tests, debugs, and creates” a master version of Windows in 
Redmond, Washington.81 Microsoft then makes a limited number of what it calls “golden 
master” disks by first developing a source code, the “human readable form of the 
software”; next, it puts the source code through a compiler that transforms the source code 
into object code, a series of ones and zeros that can be read by a machine.82 Thereafter, it 
burns the object code onto the golden master disks using a laser.83 Finally, Microsoft ships 
a number of these golden masters abroad to foreign-based computer manufacturers known 
                                                             
73 Id. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
74 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 70, at 9. 
75 Id. 
76 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
77 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 70, at 9. 
78 Id. at 10. 
79 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 70, at 9. 
80 Id. 
81 AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ. 4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. For a physical description of the golden master disks, see Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’r Internal Revenue, 
311 F.3d 1178, 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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as “original equipment manufacturers,” or “OEMs.”84 Each foreign OEM has a licensing 
agreement with Microsoft, under which it copies abroad Windows from the golden master 
and thereafter installs the foreign-made copies onto computers made abroad.85 Microsoft 
also sends golden master disks to foreign-based “replicators” which are authorized by 
Microsoft to make copies of Windows and thereafter to ship those copies to foreign 
computer manufacturers.86 The golden master disks that Microsoft supplies from the 
United States are themselves never installed on the computers made abroad.87 Microsoft 
also supplies Windows to foreign OEMs and authorized replicators by sending them an 
encrypted transmission of the software.88 Upon receiving the transmission abroad, the 
OEMs *123 and authorized replicators decrypt it and then install copies of Windows on 
computer hard drives that become part of computers sold abroad.89 
Microsoft admitted that it exported Windows with the knowledge and intent that it 
would be copied by foreign OEMs and replicators and then installed on computers 
manufactured abroad.90 All computer systems manufactured abroad containing Windows 
were sold to consumers abroad and were not for use in the United States.91 
 
                                                             




88 Id. The Supreme Court in Microsoft held that neither the Windows object code contained on the golden 
master disks nor the code contained in the electronic transmissions constituted a component under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(f), but at oral argument, the Court focused their questions primarily on the golden masters. See 
generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 2007 WL 541886 (No. 05-1056). 
Justice Scalia remarked that the term “golden disk” possessed a certain “Scheherazade quality that really 
add[ed] a lot of interest to [the] case.” Id. at *40. 
89 AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ. 4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. Except for an action under § 271(f), AT & T would have needed to bring an action under foreign patent 
laws to stop the infringement of its ‘580 patent abroad. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746, 
1759 (2007). 
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B. The Lower Court Opinions 
Microsoft made two arguments to the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York.92 Microsoft first argued that Windows object code is not a component under § 
271(f).93 Microsoft asserted that a component must be a “physical product.”94 The district 
court responded by citing Imagexpo, 95  Eolas, 96  and Microsoft v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue,97 in support *124 of its proposition that software in the abstract, like the 
Windows object code contained on the master disk, may be a component of a patented 
invention.98 The court noted that excluding software inventions from § 271(f)’s protection 
“‘would not be responsive to the challenges of a changing world’ as software and 
                                                             
92 Microsoft, 2004 WL 406640, at *4. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at *6. For this argument, Microsoft relied heavily on Bayer AG v. Housy Pharms., where the Federal 
Circuit had stated in dicta that the term “component” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000) “appears to 
contemplate a physical product.” Id. (quoting Bayer, 340 F.3d 1367, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The district 
court in Microsoft found Microsoft’s reliance on Bayer to be misplaced because Bayer is only applicable to 
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) and the “data processing” that resulted from a patented process in Bayer was wholly 
unrelated to the Windows object code at issue in Microsoft. Microsoft, 2004 WL 406640, at *6. 
95 See supra pp. 8-9. 
96 See supra p. 9. 
97 Microsoft v. Comm’r, 311 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002). In Microsoft v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 
(the “Tax Case”), Microsoft argued successfully that its golden master disks were export property for tax 
purposes under 26 U.S.C. § 927(a)(2)(B) (2000). Id. Excluded from export property are “patents, inventions, 
models, designs, formulas, or processes[,] whether or not patented, copyrights (other than films, tapes, 
records, or similar reproductions, for commercial or home use), good will, trademarks, trade brands, 
franchises, or other like property.” 26 U.S.C. §§ 993(c)(2)(B), 927(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). In the Tax 
Case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found Microsoft’s golden masters to constitute “similar 
reproductions” to “films, tapes, records” and therefore to constitute “export property.” Microsoft v. Comm’r, 
311 F.3d at 1185. The district court in AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., (the “Patent Case”), suggested that it 
was because of the outcome of the Tax Case that Microsoft retreated from its earlier argument that software 
must be in a tangible form to constitute a component in its reply brief and at oral argument. AT & T Corp. v. 
Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ. 4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004). The district court in the 
Patent Case seems to mischaracterize the holding of the Tax Case. If anything, the outcome of the Tax Case 
helps Microsoft in its patent litigation with AT & T. This is because the Ninth Circuit in the Tax Case 
interpreted the relevant sections of the Internal Revenue Code to mean that intangibles, such as copyrighted 
software, are not export property, unless they are reduced to a tangible medium of expression, such as to 
“films, tapes ... etc.” Microsoft v. Comm’r, 311 F.3d at 1183. Microsoft was not arguing that the Windows 
object code was export property, Microsoft was arguing that golden masters containing the object code were 
export property. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmation of Microsoft’s argument in the Tax Case is analogous 
to the Supreme Court’s affirmation of this argument in the Patent Case that the object code contained on the 
golden master disks was not a component, but that only the disks themselves containing the code were 
components. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1755 (2007). 
98 AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ. 4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004). 
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computers have become an essential part of society and business since the enactment of § 
271(f).”99 
Next, Microsoft argued that foreign-made copies of Windows were not 
components “supplied from the United States.”100 In response, the district court held that 
Microsoft should not be shielded from the “letter and intent” of § 271(f) just because, for 
efficiency sake, it exported a handful of master disks and electronic transmissions for 
copying abroad.101 The district court was similarly unreceptive to Microsoft’s policy 
argument that if § 271(f) applied to Windows object code, software companies (including 
Microsoft) would manufacture their golden master disks abroad. 102  Responding, the 
district court suggested that instead of manufacturing their golden master disks abroad, 
Microsoft could manufacture non-infringing devices within the United States or lobby 
Congress to amend § 271(f).103 
Based on the district court’s holdings, Microsoft entered into a settlement 
agreement with AT & T whereby Microsoft stipulated to a judgment of infringement under 
§ 271(a) and (b) for *125 its activities within the United States, but preserved its right to 
appeal the district court decision with respect to the application of § 271(f) to the golden 
master disks shipped abroad.104 
Microsoft appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and argued that 
it had not supplied any components of the computers manufactured abroad that allegedly 
                                                             
99 Id. at *5 (quoting Patent Act of 1984, H.R. 6286, 98th Cong. § 1 (1984)). 
100 Microsoft, 2004 WL 406640, at *4. 
101 Id. at *7. 
102 Id. at 1370. 
103 Id. 
104 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 70, at 11. The settlement agreement prescribed different dollar 
amounts that Microsoft must pay to AT & T depending on the outcome of Microsoft’s appeal. Id. 
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infringed AT & T’s patent.105 The court of appeals handed down its Eolas decision while 
Microsoft’s appeal in its case with AT & T was pending. 106  The court of appeals 
interpreted its own decision in Eolas to mean that Windows object code could constitute a 
component under § 271(f).107 
The court of appeals answered the remaining question of whether software 
replicated abroad from a master disk supplied from the United States, as intended by the 
software’s exporter, is “supplied from the United States” under § 271(f).108 In the software 
context, the court said that “supplying” software often involves generating a copy of that 
software.109 Further, in the case of software components under § 271(f), “the act of 
copying is subsumed in the act of ‘supplying,’ such that sending a single copy abroad with 
the intent that it be replicated invokes § 271(f) liability for those foreign-made copies.”110 
The court of appeals stated that it was interpreting § 271(f) by giving the statute’s words 
“‘their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,’ ... which is necessarily 
context-dependent.”111 
The court of appeals also held that the law should take into account the realities of 
the business practices underlying a particular litigation--in this case, the efficiency with 
which *126 Microsoft can supply one master disk for replication abroad.112 Further, 
according to the court, to allow a “technical avoidance” of § 271(f) by Microsoft would 
subvert the remedial purpose of the statute, namely to stop a copier from circumventing 
                                                             
105 AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 1369. 
108 Id. at 1369-70. 
109 Id. at 1370. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000)). 
112 Microsoft, 414 F.3d at 1371. “[T]he appellate process is not a mere academic exercise.” Id. (quoting 
Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
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U.S. patents by supplying components of an invention patented in this country for 
assembly abroad.113 Microsoft appealed the Federal Circuit’s decision and the Supreme 
Court114 granted Microsoft’s certiorari petition.115 
C. The Opinion of the United States Supreme Court 
The question before the Supreme Court was whether Microsoft’s liability for patent 
infringement extended to computers made abroad that were loaded with Windows software 
that had been copied abroad from a master disk or from an electronic transmission supplied 
by Microsoft from the United States. 116  To resolve this broad question, the Court 
examined two issues: first, whether the Windows object code contained on the golden 
master disks qualified as a component under § 271(f); 117  and second, whether any 
components of the foreign-assembled computers were “supplie[d]” by Microsoft “from the 
United States.”118 
Regarding the first issue, it was crucial to AT & T that it convince the Court that the 
Windows object code encoded on the master disk was a component that Microsoft had 
“supplied” from the United States. 119  This argument was essential because “[i]f the 
relevant components [were] the copies of Windows actually installed on the 
foreign[-made] computers, *127 [as opposed to the object code contained on the master 
                                                             
113 Microsoft, 414 F.3d. at 1371. 
114 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746 (No. 05-1056). See 
also Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. 1746 (No. 05-1056). 
115 AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 467 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2006) (No. 
05-1056). 
116 Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1750-51 (2007). 
117 Id. at 1753-54. The Supreme Court asserted that its analysis, while focused entirely on 35 U.S.C. § 
271(f)(1), is equally applicable to 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2), and further, that the Court’s choice between the two 
paragraphs did not affect its analysis of the legal issues involved. Id. at 1757 n.16. Justice Stevens in his 
dissent, however, suggested that the outcome of the case turned on whether the Court applied § 271(f)(1) or § 
271(f)(2) and that § 271(f)(2) best supported AT & T’s position. Id. at 1762. See infra p. 20. 
118 Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1753-54. 
119 Id. at 1754. 
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disks,] AT & T could not persuasively argue that those components, though generated 
abroad, were ‘supplie[d] ... from the United States”’ as required by § 271(f).120 
The Court began its analysis of whether software qualifies as a component under § 
271(f) by interpreting the terms of § 271(f) “in accordance with [their] ordinary or natural 
meaning.”121 The Court held that “component” meant “‘a constituent part,’ ‘element,’ or 
‘ingredient.”’ 122  The Court concluded Windows object code detached from a 
computer-readable medium such as a CD-ROM could not be “combined” with other 
components to form AT & T’s patented speech-processing computer.123 Because the 
object code, the abstract set of instructions encoded on the golden master disks, was 
“uncombinable,” it could not qualify as a component under § 271(f). 124  The Court 
analogized the Windows object code contained on the disks to a “blueprint” that is not 
itself a component of any patented device, but instead a precise set of instructions for the 
configuration of a device.125 
Contrary to the Court’s opinion on the first issue, a strong argument can be made 
that the Windows object code at issue in Microsoft is “combinable” within the ordinary 
meaning of the term.126 From the Microsoft facts, to make AT & T’s speech-processing 
computer all that is needed is a computer and a software program capable of instructing the 
                                                             
120 Id. In light of the Supreme Court’s reasoning, Judge Rader’s dissent in the district court below makes 
sense only if he, while agreeing with the court of appeals that software could qualify as a component under § 
271(f), did not find that software in the abstract unattached to a physical medium could also qualify as a 
component. See AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1372-76 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
121 Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1755 (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (addressing whether a 
constitutional due process tort claim was “cognizable” under the jurisdictional grant of the Federal Tort 
Clams Act necessarily called upon the Court to define the term “cognizable” in the context of the statute) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
122 Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1755 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 466 (3d ed. 1981)). 
123 Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1755. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69. 
126 See THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 408 (2d ed. 1987) 
(defining “combine” as “to bring into or join in a close union or whole; unite”). 
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computer to process *128 speech in a manner than “practices” AT & T’s patent.127 The 
Court reasoned that because a hard drive or a CD-ROM containing the appropriate 
software may be “combined” with a computer to make AT & T’s patented invention, the 
hard drive or CD-ROM with the software contained therein is a component within the 
meaning of § 271(f).128 However, it seems an empty hard drive may be “combined” with 
the appropriate software object code transferred from a CD-ROM or electronic 
transmission and thereafter “combined” with a computer to make AT & T’s patented 
invention. Therefore, Windows object code alone seems to conform to the Court’s 
definition of “component” as something “amenable to ‘combination.”’129 
Further, the language of § 271(f) precludes applying the term “component” to 
object code not because object code is “uncombinable,” as the Court asserted,130 but 
because it is intangible. Courts should interpret Section 271(f) as requiring tangible rather 
than intangible components for two reasons. First, Congress enacted § 271(f) “so that the 
Deepsouth Supreme Court case would be decided differently in the future.” 131  The 
components at issue in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp. were all of the tangible 
parts needed to assemble a shrimp-deveining machine132 that Deepsouth had shipped 
abroad for assembly.133 
 
 
                                                             
127 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
128 See supra p. 17. 
129 Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1755 (2007). 
130 Id. 
131 S.1535, 98th Cong. § 1, at 22 (1983) (statement of Secretary Mossinghoff, Assistant Secretary and 
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Patent and Trademark Office) 
132 See supra pp. 4-5. Granted, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) was not exactly tailored to reverse Deepsouth. If that was 
the case, Congress would not have enacted § 271(f)(2), which applies where there is only one component at 
issue that is not a “staple” article or commodity of commerce. See supra note 38. 
133 See supra note 32. 
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Second, the definition of “component” as ‘a constituent part,’ ‘element,’ or 
‘ingredient,’ 134  implies that the term “component” encompasses tangible and not 
intangible components. If Congress had not intended that the term have an ordinary or 
natural meaning, it *129 would have expressed this intent in the language of the statute. 
Further, the legislative history indicates that Congress did not consider applying § 271(f) to 
intangibles.135 The Court reasoned, “[i]n a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly 
marked our course, we must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a 
legislative enactment which never contemplated such a calculus of interests.”136 
Regarding the second issue of whether any components of the foreign assembled 
computers were “supplie[d]” by Microsoft “from the United States,” the Supreme Court 
agreed with Judge Rader, dissenter to the court of appeal’s opinion below, and held that the 
“act of copying” was not “subsumed in the act of ‘supplying”’ under § 271(f).137 The 
Court held that the copies of Windows installed on foreign-made computers were not 
“supplied” from the United States within the meaning of § 271(f).138 Rather, third parties 
abroad made these copies from master disks or electronic transmissions supplied by 
Microsoft from the United States.139 Justices Alito, Thomas, and Breyer, who concurred in 
the judgment, emphasized that “because no physical object originating in the United States 
was combined with the foreign-made computers, there was no violation of § 271(f).”140 
Further, although the court of appeals noted how easily one could copy software abroad 
                                                             
134 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
135 See S.1535, 98th Cong. § 1 (1983); S.REP. NO. 98-663 (1984). 
136 Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1760 (2007) (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984)). 
137 Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1756-57 (quoting AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (Judge Rader, dissenting)). 
138 Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1757. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 1762. 
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from a few master disks, the Court found nothing in the text of § 271(f) addressing the 
relevance of the ease of copying software.141 
AT & T argued that interpreting § 271 to apply only to tangible copies of Windows 
actually sent from the United States created a “loophole” for software companies like 
Microsoft *130 to avoid the cost of licensing the right to use patented technology, such as 
AT & T’s speech processor.142 The Court acknowledged the existence of this “loophole,” 
but concluded it “is properly left for Congress to consider, and to close if it finds such 
action warranted.”143 
Justice Stevens dissented from the opinion of the Court: He believed that the 
decision of the court of appeals was “more faithful to the intent of the Congress that 
enacted § 271(f) than a reversal.”144 Departing from the majority’s view that it is of no 
consequence whether (f)(1) or (f)(2) applies, Justice Stevens asserted that (f)(2) supported 
a judgment in favor of AT & T.145 Under (f)(2), the export of a special knife for use in a 
deveining machine that had no use other than as a part of that machine would constitute 
infringement.146 Justice Stevens analogized one of Microsoft’s golden master disks to “an 
inventory of such knives to be warehoused until used to complete the assembly of an 
infringing machine.”147 
Justice Stevens’ “inventory of knives” analogy would be more appropriate if the 
golden master disk contained many copies of Windows, one for each computer 
manufactured abroad by the recipient of the golden master. However, the golden master 
                                                             
141 Id. at 1759-60. 
142 Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1759 (2007). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 1762 
145 Id. at 1762-63. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 1763 
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disks at issue, contained only one copy of Windows--no copies were removed from the 
golden master disks and installed on the computers made abroad.148 Rather, the copy on 
the master disk was duplicated and the duplicated copies were installed on computers made 
abroad.149 
Justice Stevens also compared the Windows object code to an “ingredient,”150 in 
contrast to the majority, which compared the Windows object code to a “blueprint.”151 The 
majority held *131 that Windows object code was not a component under § 271(f) because 
software object code is like a “blueprint” that is “uncombinable” with other components to 
make the patented invention.152 Arguably, object code is a hybrid. In one sense, object 
code is instructions, in another sense, it is a component. Widows object code is like a set of 
instructions or a blueprint in that the code tells the computer what functions to perform.153 
But unlike the instructions at issue in Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc.,154 the Windows 
object code becomes a part of the invention.155 Thus, the Court should have held that while 
software object code is “combinable,” it is not a component because § 271(f) does not 
apply to intangibles as parts of a patented invention.156 
To illustrate, object code is like a song that a player piano or music box plays.157 A 
player piano has a rotating cylinder (a roller), through which air blows, and a set of holes 
                                                             
148 See supra pp. 12-13. 
149 See id. 
150 See Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1763 (2007). 
151 See supra p. 17. 
152 See id. 
153 See Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1755. 
154 See supra p. 10. 
155 Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1755. “Software’s instructions ... are contained in and continuously performed by 
a computer.” Id. 
156 See supra p. 18. 
157 See Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1756 n. 12. Justice Ginsberg suggested an analogy along these lines. Id. 
Readers may find an analogy to a mechanical music box more familiar. In the case of a music box, the song is 
reflected physically by pins protruding from a rotating cylinder, which strike metal combs that vibrate and 
produce the melody. LOUIS BLOOMFIELD, HOW EVERYTHING WORKS: MAKING PHYSICS OUT 
OF THE ORDINARY 313-14 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) (2007). 
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on the roller, where each hole corresponds to a particular piano key. Each note sounds 
when air passes through its corresponding hole, actuating the piano key.158 Without the 
roller’s physical manifestation of the song (the unique hole arrangement), the player piano 
would remain silent. Similarly, without the Windows object code installed on the hard 
drive, a computer is incapable of functioning as AT & T’s patented speech processor.159 
Both the song and the object code are physically incorporated into the player piano and the 
computer respectively; in the case of the computer, the *132 physical incorporation is in 
the form of magnetizing particles on tiny patches of the surface of the hard drive.160 Also, 
both are “combined” with other parts to form the two devices.161 Unlike the roller itself, 
which is a tangible part to the player piano, like the gears and levers of the 
shrimp-deveining machines at issue in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,162 the 
song and the object code are intangibles. 163  Where the legislative history endorses 
applying § 271(f) to the former, it is silent on applying § 271(f) to the latter.164 
IV. The Need for a Congressional Response 
A. Section 271(f) Ceases to Have Any Meaning for the Software Industry 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 271(f) to exclude intangible software such 
as Windows object code as a component provides limited protections for the U.S. software 
industry. 165  The Court’s holding allows Microsoft and other U.S.-based software 
companies to avoid liability under § 271(f) by supplying software abroad for copying and 
                                                             
158 See THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, supra note 124, at 1463, 1485. 
159 See supra text accompanying note 73. 
160 BLOOMFIELD, supra note 157, at 397-98. 
161 See supra pp. 17-18. 
162 See supra pp. 4-5. 
163 See Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1760-61 (2007). 
164 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
165 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 70, at 39. 
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installation.166 
Section 271(f), as interpreted by the Court in Microsoft, does not preclude a 
company from shipping disks to foreign manufacturers that are later physically 
incorporated into the individual computers manufactured abroad.167 When a computer 
program is downloaded from a disk onto a computer’s hard drive, a copy is generated.168 
Only in exceptional cases would an end user run a computer program directly from the disk 
(supplied from the United States) physically installed in the computer rather than 
download the program onto the hard drive before *133 using the program.169 The copy of 
the program used in almost every case would therefore be the copy made abroad during the 
downloading process.170 If avoiding liability under § 271(f) rests on this step, surely 
Microsoft and other software companies would require foreign computer users to 
download all software programs before use.171 
Additionally, § 271(f), as interpreted in Microsoft, does not prevent software 
companies from sending every user abroad a hard drive with the software program at issue 
already installed on it.172 Before a computer can actually run the software program, it must 
“call up the object code from a storage medium ... and incorporate it into arrangements of 
electrical charges in its RAM.”173 There would still be no liability under § 271(f) pursuant 
to Microsoft because the copy of the software program installed on the RAM would be a 
separate copy distinct from the copy of the software program stored on the hard drive 
                                                             





171 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 70, at 39. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 39-40 (citing E. GARRISON WALTERS, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO COMPUTING, 41 
(2001)). 
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supplied from the United States.174 
End users arguably would not even use the same copy of the software supplied 
from the United States if Microsoft sent fully assembled computers that were running the 
Windows program from their hard drives upon arrival overseas.175 Microsoft therefore 
results in “treat[ing] the software industry differently from all other industries by 
precluding any meaningful application—indeed any application at all—of Section 271(f) 
to the supply of software components abroad.”176 
*134 B. Harm to Certain Industries and Encouragement of Offshoring 
Not applying § 271(f) to the software industry gives Microsoft and other “new 
economy” software companies an advantage over “traditional” electronics companies.177 
“New economy” software companies like Microsoft arguably benefit from software piracy 
because the existence of pirated software increases demand for applications that run on the 
pirated software.178 For Microsoft in particular, the more users of Windows, the larger 
Microsoft’s network monopoly for its operating system.179 
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s Microsoft decision will likely harm the U.S. 
biotechnology industry.180 Copies of software are analogous to copies of genetic code.181 
                                                             
174 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 70, at 40. 
175 See supra text accompanying notes 173-74. 
176 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 70, at 41. 
177 Brief of Amicus Curiae U.S. Philips Corp. and Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. Supporting Respondent at 
23-24, Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746 (2007) (No. 05-1056), 2007 WL 197102. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 24. 
180 Brief of Amicus Curiae Bayhdole25, Inc. Supporting Respondent at 12, Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 
127 S.Ct. 1746 (2007) (No. 05-1056), 2007 WL 197101. BayhDole is a non-profit non-governmental 
organization, which purpose is to improve public awareness of the importance of the policies underlying the 
BayhDole Act of 1980 to “provid[e] a high return on the taxpayer’s investment in basic science in the form of 
medical innovation and improving health outcomes through the creation of high-technology and 
biotechnology sectors.” Id. at 1-2. 
181 Id. at 15-16. 
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While it is not possible to reverse-engineer genetic code (as it is computer software) 
through the use of instructions, it is extremely cost-effective for a biotechnology 
competitor to commercialize genetically modified organisms patented in the United States 
abroad using one sample of the patented genetic material that would itself remain 
unchanged when copied abroad, very much like the Windows object code at issue in 
Microsoft. 182  If courts will not apply § 271(f) to intangible goods, biotechnology 
entrepreneurs are exposed to widespread copying of their inventions for sale abroad.183 In 
turn, small biotechnology entrepreneurs may have trouble *135 obtaining funding, perhaps 
causing the United States to lose its preeminence in the biotechnology industry.184 
One of the purposes of enacting § 271(f) was to discourage offshore manufacture 
that “is [both] disadvantageous to an innovative economy ... and is unfair to inventors.”185 
However, the Supreme Court’s Microsoft decision arguably encourages offshore 
manufacturing, at least in the software industry.186 Thus, certain American jobs may be at 
risk.187187 End-product manufacturers now have the incentive to locate their operations 




                                                             
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 16. 
184 Id. 
185 S.1535, 98th Cong. § 1, at 146 (1983) (statement of John E. Maurer, General Consulting Attorney, 
Monsanto Co.). 
186 See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 70, at 49. Another commentator asserted that 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) 
was “ill-conceived” in terms of economic policy because the statute’s immediate effect was “to create one 
more incentive for U.S. companies who compete in foreign markets to move their manufacturing facilities 
abroad.” Comment, Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empiracal Territoriality in Intellectual Property: 
Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 603, 607 (1997). 
187 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 70, at 49. 
188 Id. 
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C. Questions Left Unanswered by the Supreme Court in Microsoft 
The Microsoft Court left a handful of unresolved questions for future software 
infringement cases.189 For example, the Court did not address whether software in the 
abstract, or any other intangible, could ever constitute a component of a patented invention 
under § 271(f).190 However, the Court speculated that if an intangible qualified as a 
patented invention, the invention’s components might also be intangible.191 The patented 
invention at issue in Microsoft was tangible, a computer that processed speech in a certain 
way. 192  Given the Court’s *136 conclusion that Windows object code was not a 
component because it was “uncombinable,” 193  it seems unlikely that software in the 
abstract could ever qualify as a component. According to the Court, “an idea without 
physical embodiment . . . does not match § 271(f)’s categorization: ‘components’ 
amenable to ‘combination.”’194 And so, it seems that all software object code, even object 
code that is part of an intangible invention, would be outside the scope of what constitutes 
a “component” under § 271(f).195 
The Court also did not address the issue of whether Microsoft would be liable if the 
disks containing Windows shipped from the United States were used to directly install 
Windows on each foreign-made computer.196 Justices Alito, Thomas, and Breyer, who 
concurred with the opinion of the Court, asserted that had the disks shipped from the 
                                                             
189 See generally Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746 (2007). 
190 Id. at 1756 n. 13. 
191 Id. Patents have been granted on certain kinds of intangible inventions, such as business methods and 
designs, but courts have thus far refused to extend § 271(f) to method and design patents. See supra notes 
51-52 and accompanying text. 
192 Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1759 n.13. 
193 See supra p. 17. 
194 Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1755. 
195 See generally Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. 1746. 
196 Id. at 1757 n.14. 
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United States been used to directly install Windows on each computer made abroad, 
Microsoft would be liable under § 271(f). 197  They maintained that a foreign-made 
computer becomes an infringing device when enough of the software code is installed on it 
so as to permit the computer to function as the patented invention. 198  Further, they 
reasoned that a computer continues to be an infringing device after installing the software 
code and removing the installation device, such as a CD-ROM,199 because the software 
code remains on the hard drive and the computer is still permitted to function as the 
patented invention.200 
The position of Justices Alito, Thomas, and Breyer on this unresolved issue is at 
odds with the Court’s majority opinion.201 To illustrate, when Microsoft installs Windows 
on a *137 foreign-made computer, a copy is generated and stored on the computer’s hard 
drive.202 The computer utilizes this copy of Windows on the hard drive and not the copy of 
Windows on the CD-ROM supplied from the United States to process speech in a manner 
that “practices” AT & T’s patent.203 Because the copy of Windows incorporated into the 
computer abroad is different from the copy of Windows contained on the CD-ROM 
supplied from the United States, the Microsoft Court’s holding precludes a finding of 
infringement under § 271(f) here as well.204 
A third remaining question is whether source code, the human readable version of 
object code that has yet to be put through a compiler, qualifies as a component under § 
                                                             
197 See id. at 1761-62. 
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271(f).205 Assuming that the software source code was sent to computer manufacturers 
abroad, compiled, and then installed on foreign-manufactured computers the component 
installed on the computers, the object code, would be different from the component 
supplied from the United States, the source code. As a result there would be no liability 
under § 271(f). 
D. Legislative Response Needed 
The Microsoft Supreme Court construed the term “component” to mean a tangible 
copy of the Windows object code, such as the golden master CD-ROM Microsoft supplied 
from the United States, and left Congress to amend § 271(f) to define “component” 
differently. 206  At present, Congress has not changed U.S. patent law in response to 
Microsoft; the Patent Reform Act of 2007, which passed in the House of Representatives 
on September 7, 2007, and has been placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar, leaves § 
271(f) untouched.207 For now, the term *138 “component” in the context of § 271(f) will 
not apply to software object code unattached to physical media.208 
In his dissent to Microsoft, Justice Stevens asserted: “if a disk with software 
inscribed on it is a ‘component,’ I find it difficult to understand why the most important 
ingredient of that component is not also a component.”209 Perhaps Justice Stevens is 
correct. 
Congress responded to the Supreme Court’s Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
                                                             
205 The district court in Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. found the source code contained on Microsoft’s 
golden master not to be intangible information, but instead “a real and substantial part of the final product.” 
See supra note 62. 
206 Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1759-60 (2007). 
207 See H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007). 
208 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 70, at 37 (citing Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3838, 109th Cong. § 
5(f) (2006)). This is in spite of the fact that Microsoft “[was] actively lobbying for legislation that, in its most 
aggressive form, would eliminate Section 271(f) outright.” Brief for the Respondent, supra note 70, at 37. 
209 Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1763. 
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Corp decision by enacting section 271(f).210 Deepsouth concerned the tangible parts to a 
mechanical invention, not the intangible components of a software-based invention.211 
While § 271(f) was not written so narrowly as to only reverse Deepsouth,212 the statute 
was not written so broadly as to cover intangibles such as the Windows object code at issue 
in Microsoft.213 However, the same policy behind enacting § 271(f) applies here--the same 
“subterfuge” of the spirit behind the patent system exists in the software context today as it 
existed after Deepsouth. Senator Thurmond, who submitted the Committee on the 
Judiciary’s Report on The Patent Law Amendments of 1984, asserted that “[§ 271(f)] is 
needed to help maintain a climate in the United States conducive to invention, innovation, 
and investment[;] [p]ermitting the subterfuge which is allowed under the Deepsouth 
interpretation of the Patent Act weakens the confidence in patents among businesses and 
investors.”214 For this reason, this Note proposes a legislative response to render Microsoft 
mute as it applies to the supply of software for copying and installation abroad. 
*139 Congress should amend § 271(f) by adding a new paragraph, (f)(3), to read 
“for purposes of this section, the term ‘component’ includes intangible software 
components even if such components are staple articles or commodities of commerce 
suitable for substantial non-infringing use.” In doing so, Congress would respond to the 
holding of the Supreme Court in Microsoft just as it had responded to the holding of the 
Court in Deepsouth.215 As in 1984, amending § 271(f) as suggested above “would correct a 
number of troublesome aspects of the patent laws and thereby enhance the benefits of the 
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patent system to inventors and businesses.”216 
V. Conclusion 
Microsoft was a landmark case in American patent law.217 The question before the 
Supreme Court was whether Microsoft’s liability for patent infringement extended to 
computers made abroad that were loaded with Windows software copied abroad from a 
master disk or an electronic transmission supplied by Microsoft from the United States.218 
The Court held that it did not. According to the Court, Microsoft’s Windows object code, 
detached from a computer-readable medium like a CD-ROM, was “uncombinable” and 
therefore not a component within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).219 Thus, because 
Microsoft supplied no component from the United States, to be combined with the 
computers made abroad, it did not violate § 271(f).220 
The plain meaning of § 271(f) as well as the legislative history precludes applying 
the term “component” to intangibles. Windows object code is perhaps most like a song a 
player piano or music box plays. Object code, like a player piano song, when physically 
incorporated *140 into a device, instructs the device on what functions to perform. No one 
would argue that the roller inside the player piano is not a component of the player piano 
under § 271(f). The song and the object code differ from the roller in that the song and the 
object code are intangibles. 
The Court’s holding in Microsoft arguably exposes a “loophole” for U.S. software 
manufacturers to avoid the cost of obtaining licenses for software technologies they exploit 
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abroad.221 For now, software object code remains beyond the protection of American 
patent law. Arguably, the Court’s holding in Microsoft precludes any application of § 
271(f) to U.S. software manufacturers supplying software for use abroad.222 Congress 
should amend § 271(f) to treat intangible software code as a component protected from 
infringement if supplied from the United States for copying abroad. Only then will 
American creators of intellectual property be assured of meaningful global protection for 
their software technologies, eliminating the deleterious consequences to innovation that 
could result should Microsoft remain as precedent. 
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